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Secure Build and Supply-Chain Architecture

Why this chapter matters

A trustworthy build is a chain of evidence from source to running artifact. This chapter gives humans and AI readers a way to see dependencies, transformations, approvals, and compromises before convenience turns an unknown component into a silent authority.

Continue to Network and Gateway Architecture to see how the finished system meets the outside world.

Defines provenance, integrity, review, promotion, rollback, and compromise boundaries for software, models, datasets, firmware, and configuration.

  • INFRA9-R001: A promotable artifact SHALL identify origin, inputs, transformations, digest, review state, licence, and limitations.
  • INFRA9-R002: Unknown, conflicting, revoked, or incomplete provenance SHALL block or bound promotion.
  • INFRA9-R003: Build and promotion evidence SHALL be reproducible or explicitly record why reproduction was unavailable.
  • INFRA9-R004: Artifact integrity SHALL not create authority, permission, or trust beyond the governing decision.
  • INFRA9-R005: Supply-chain review SHALL identify producers, inputs, transformations, dependencies, licences, reviewers, promotion threshold, quarantine state, and rollback evidence.
  • INFRA9-R006: Reproducibility, independence, vulnerability state, and licence applicability SHALL be stated separately from digest equality.
  • INFRA9-R007: A compromised, unknown, conflicting, or stale component SHALL remain quarantined or bounded until an accountable review records disposition.
  • INFRA9-R008: A supply-chain design SHALL NOT build, sign, promote, deploy, or procure a live artifact; it remains conceptual.

This Draft excludes live build pipelines and artifact promotion.

Assessment method

Supply-chain assessment shall map producers, inputs, transformations, reviewers, build environments, dependencies, licences, release conditions, and rollback evidence. Independence and reproducibility limits shall be recorded rather than assumed.

Failure cases

Unsigned substitution, dependency confusion, compromised builder, unexplained binary difference, licence conflict, stale vulnerability evidence, and missing provenance shall block or bound promotion.

Operating model and evidence

Supply-chain architecture follows an artifact from producer through inputs, transformations, build environment, dependency set, review, quarantine, promotion, rollback, and retirement. Each edge records provenance, integrity, licence, vulnerability window, reproducibility, and reviewer independence. A digest establishes equality to an input; it does not establish that the input is trustworthy or authorised.

Reviewers test dependency confusion, compromised builders, unexplained binary differences, stale vulnerability evidence, licence conflict, unsigned substitution, and incomplete rollback. Promotion remains a recorded decision with a threshold and owner. Unknown evidence narrows or blocks promotion rather than being silently filled.

Interpretation cases

  • Conforming: Artifact lineage, inputs, transformations, review, licence, vulnerability, quarantine, and rollback are recorded.
  • Prohibited: Integrity or convenience creates authority to promote.
  • Boundary: An incomplete build remains quarantined with a bounded evidence claim.
  • Failure: Reproducibility or provenance failure blocks promotion and preserves the record.
  • Loophole: A dependency or builder bypasses the declared review boundary.
  • Misuse: Supply-chain records expose secrets or private operational details.
  • Care-control: Integrity controls protect people and continuity while preserving proportionate review.

Design evidence

Supply-chain review should retain a component inventory, source and transformation lineage, reproducibility result, reviewer independence, licence decision, vulnerability window, promotion threshold, rollback path, and quarantine state. A digest proves equality to an input, not trust in the input.